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During the recent three decades, 1980~2010, the Japanese economy has experienced a period of rapid 
growth followed by two stagnant decades with serious financial distress and continuous deflation. In 
this process, Japan established a strong base for manufacturing industries in the world but could not 
handle the external shocks—the Plaza Accord, the rise of China, the Asian financial Crisis and the 2008 
Financial Crisis—and adjust its economy to the dramatic changes in the energy/resources and financial 
markets. This paper sums up the representative views of Japanese economists on these problems and 
then presents the author’s own opinions. A sharp and continuous decline of economic growth was 
caused not only by external events but also aggravated by the mismanagement of private and public 
agencies, particularly in the financial sector. The author relies on a number of outstanding works by 
Japanese and foreign economies like Mitsuo Saito (1927-2010), The Japanese Economy, WSPC, 
2000.; 3 volumes edited by Fumio Hayashi, Positive Analysis and Design of Economic Institutions (J). 
Keiso Shobo, 2007, besides his own studies: Political Economy of Japanese and Asian Development, 
Springer-Verlag and Sobun-sha, 2003 and other essays. One important work is Tadao Kagono, The 
Spirit of Management (J), Japan Productivity Center Pub. Co., 2010 which pointed out that the Japanese 
government made a mistake in reforming the Corporation law, at the suggestion of the US government, 
to change the behavior patterns of Japanese entrepreneurs toward less risk-taking when more out-
ward-looking behaviors are required in this uncertain world nowadays, and lost the precious traditional 
spirit of Japanese-style management. All other important references are given at the end of the paper 
with a statistical appendix.  
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1 This paper was originally presented at the 38th International Conference of the Korean Academy of Sciences in 




I. A Steady Decline of Japanese Economic Growth: 1970 - 2010 
Table 1 summarizes the performance of Japanese economy from 1945 to the present. After the 
post-WWⅡrecovery, rapid growth continued up to 1972. Then the oil shocks and Nixon shocks 
(revaluation of Yen and rapprochement with China) 
  
Table 1: Per iodization of Postwar Japanese Political Economy and the Growth Rates 
 Sub-periods of postwar years GDP/pop ¥/$ rate growth rate 
1 1945~52: the Occupation Period $ 380 ¥ 360 5.0  % 
2 1952~60: the Reconstruction Period $ 760 ¥360 9.2  % 
3 1960~70: the Rapid Growth Period $ 966 ¥360 10.4  % 
4 1970~80: the Shock Period $ 4789 ¥217 5.2  % 
5 1980~90: the Internationalization Period $ 14,387 ¥ 141 3.8  % 
6 1990~2000: the Reform Period $ 32,496 ¥ 110 1.1  % 
7 2000~10: the Globalization Period $ 53,581 ¥  85 0.65  % 
notes: 1. GDP per capita in $ is calculated by deflating the nominal Japanese GDP in terms of current ex-
change rates given in IMF International Financial Statistics as the mean over a decade, except for $380 is 
for 1948 and $ 760 is for 1956. Hence, they reflect the revaluation of ¥/$ rates, 2. The growth rates of real 
GDP are calculated as an annual average in each period from real GDP’s in Japanese Yen. Data Sources: S. 
Ichimura [3] and Appendix to this paper.     
hit Japan in the 70s. Its growth rate suddenly dropped to half: 5.2 % and continued down, down to 
as low as 1 % now. In the 80s, however, she still kept a satisfactory rate of growth as a developed 
economy around $ 15,000- per capita GDP. Then came the Plaza Accord in September 1985 
which forced Japan to revalue the yen and ignited the so-called bubble economy bursting in 1991 
through 92. Another challenge in the 80a was the success of Den Xiao Ping’s Open and Reform in 
China. In 1997 occurred Asian Financial Crisis in Thailand and later spread to other countries. 
Then came the Lehman Brothers crisis in 2008, which soon spread all over as the World Financial 
Crisis until now. Thus the steady decline of Japanese growth in the past seems to be at least partly 
caused by a series of external shocks and the economic crises originating abroad. One could ask if 
the Japanese government policies would have been appropriate to maintain the growth rate better. 
One should notice that there were three unique characteristics associated with the Japanese eco-
nomic decline of growth.   
(1) Rapid revaluation of Japanese Yen vis-a-vis US$ (¥360 to ¥77 now over 40 years) or Euro-
pean currencies nearly five times or more. No other hard currency experienced such a high 
revaluation.  
(2) Deflation accompanied the slow growth after the burst of bubble in the mid-90s for almost 20 
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years.  
(3) The fertility rate has declined rapidly and life expectancy became the longest in the world, 
making the ratio of active labor force to population became the lowest in the world. Recently 
the total population began to fall. 
 
II. Changes in Growth Factors for the Lost Two Decades 
For the rapidly growing period: 1945-1972, my paper: “The Challenge of the Rising Sun,” in 
Quadrant, an Australian journal in 19702
Table 2: Changes in Growth Factors in pre- and post-Bubble Periods 
 identified ten factors for growth that are shown in Table 
2.  
 Favorable Factors for Rapid Growth Changes after 
1990 
1 High Rate of Capital Accumulation, ↘ 
2 High Propensity to Save → 
3 Industrious, Well-educated Labor ↘ 
4 Rapid Increase in Agricultural Productivity, ↘ 
5 Borrowed and Improved Technology ↘ 
6 Appropriate Choice of Industrial Composition → 
7 Capable Bureaucrats and Cooperation with Private Enterprises → 
8 Group Loyalty of Japanese Employees ↘ 
9 Positive Roles of Banks and Close Relations with Private Enterprises ↘ 
10 Political Stability ↘ 
Notes: 1) ↘ implies that the factor declined, and → implies that the factor remained unchanged. 2) 
Some new factors emerged as important to determine the growth path in the lost two decades. They 
are discussed in Section Ⅲ.   
 
Table 3: Ten Growth Factors during the Lost Two Decades 
No. Factors Studies Based 
1  The low rate of capital accumulation Horioka[2];OECD 
data 
2 The propensity to save did not change very much. Horioka [2] 
3 Low fertility, aging population, and shorter working hours Saito [13],   
4 Weakening of primary industries   
5 technological innovations slow down [2] and [11] 
6 Insufficient adjustment of Industrial composition to meet Chinese and Korean challenge   [2] and [3] 
7 Insufficient reform of bureaucratic system and deregulation   
                                                        
2 It is reproduced as Chap. 2 in Ichimura [4]. 
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8 Failure in reforming private enterprises d Kagono [7] 
 9 Poor working of financial and fiscal administration  [1], [10]~ [15] 
10 Political instability [1] vol. Ⅲ, [4] 
 
They worked in a virtuous circle then but gradually disappeared in the 70s and later and . During 
the lost two decades, the same factors could no longer work as well as before. The political econ-
omy of the domestic conditions and the international circumstances greatly changed and caused a 
sharp and steady decline of Japanese growth rates. The arrows in the last column of Table 2 show 
their direction of changes. How the roles of these factors have changed after 1990 has been studied 
by many academic and government economists in Japan and abroad3
 
.   
  
                                                        
3 Hayashi [1] gives references to many articles by Japanese and foreign economists . 
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Figure 1: The Fertility Rates of Japan and Other Countries 
 
Sources: Ministry of Welfare and Labor, Special Report on Statistics of Population Dynamics, 
2001; Statistics of Population Dynamics, all years; Institute of Population Problems, Sources 
of Population Statistics, 2010; Korea National Statistics Office.  
Note: Line colors: Purple—USA; light yellow—Korea; dark yellow—Italy; blue—Sweden; 
light blue—UK; black—France (2.00 in 2010); Bold black—Japan.    
 
Some emphasized the shortage of Effective Demand (Demand-siders), whereas others 
pointed out the changes in the supply side of the Japanese economy (Supply-siders). We will 
briefly sketch the main arguments in the order of Table 2, while adding some new 
growth-deterrent factors that characterize the period of lost two decades and offer our tentative 
conclusions at the end. Table 3 sum up the changes in the conditions of growth factors and refers to 
various studies I have based my conclusions. More specific discussions on the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997-98 and on the recent World Financial Crisis after 2008 will be given in Sections V 
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and VI.   
(1)  (Low Rate of Investment)  From 1960 to 90, the share of total capital formation in GDP was 
around 30 %. During the lost two decades, it dropped to slightly above 20%. Sometimes the in-
vestment growth rate became negative. This is a cause and an effect of long recessions during the 
lost two decades and most conspicuous of all the factors characterizing this period. There are 
many reasons why this occurred. Some of the external events have been mentioned. Certainly the 
increasing uncertainty in the world political economy like the fall of Berlin Wall in September 
1989 is important, but an important fact is that Japan seems to have suffered more seriously than 
other major countries. In the following explanation, we will try to give some reasons.  
(2)  (Personal Savings) The propensity to save has remained almost unchanged before and after 
1990 so that Private Consumption did not work to press sown the growth of GDP. Its growth rate 
was slightly higher than GDP’s. 
(3)  (Declining Population and Labor Supply) The most dramatic change in recent Japan took 
place in the conditions of labor supply. Fundamentally, as Figure 1 shows, the fertility rate has 
kept dropping after 1970, and now it is 1.34 (slightly up from the bottom). Saito [16] calculated 
by simulating his macroeconometric model to attribute the growth rate of GDP in 1960-73 
(9.46%) to the growth rate of population (3.76%) and the growth rate of technical progress (5.56). 
A decline of population and technical progress naturally explains the radical drop in GDP growth 
rate—an important proposition of supply-siders4
(4)  (Low Productivity of Primary Industries)  Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry suffered from 
the shortage of young workers. In recent years one can see that the precious cultivable land all 
over the country remains uncultivated simply because of the shortage of farmers. Sons and 
daughters of farmers have gone to the urban factories and do not come back. This is not only due 
to the income differentials between secondary-tertiary industries and the primary industry but also 
the too restrictive and out-of-date regulations on the use and sale of farming land and forest and 
protection of fishing rights.  
. . 
(5)  (Insufficient Technological Innovations)  No doubt, the speed of Japanese technological 
                                                        
4 As for the supply side, the quality of labor is important. The nominal level of education in school years or college ad-
mission did not change much, but its quality seems to have deteriorated. About twenty years ago, Ministry of Education 
lowered the standard of text books for mathematics, natural sciences and other subjects at the primary school level. Alt-
hough this was corrected some years ago after severe criticisms from university educators and professionals, it is afraid 
that the effects remain for many years to come. Training on the job has deteriorated against good tradition of the Japanese 
enterprises. Moreover, in 1988 the Labor Standards Act was revised to shorten the standard labor hours per week, which 
reduced the performed labor hours nation-wide (from 44 to 40 hours in 88 to 93). All these elements worked in effect to 
reduce the Total Factor Productivity. 
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progress has slowed down, broadly speaking, as her technology catches up with the Western 
technology. Various studies of TFP (total factor productivity) in Japan show that during the recent 
two decades its growth rate has declined but not as much as the first research of Hayashi-Prescott 
suspected. According to METI report [12], the statistical data of Science and Technological Pa-
tents applied and obtained by Japanese experts in the US and Europe does not seem to show any 
significant decline, though the data in METI report are not up to date. Since the recent rate of cap-
ital accumulation is less than before, and the R & D expenditure is not increasing as much as in 
the earlier years, it may be natural that technical progress slows down.  
In addition, the 1988 revision of Labor Standards Act mentioned in no. 3 above and no sig-
nificant deregulation of employment—at the time of Koizumi Cabinet some deregulation was 
done -- at private enterprises have caused the slower pace of TFP increase. Yet the slower growth 
of Effective Demand could not absorb the supply of Aggregate Output, causing deflation 
throughout the lost two decades5
(6)  (Adjustment of Industrial Composition)  As the Japanese economy grew up, readjustment of 
the composition of manufacturing industries became increasingly difficult. Big ships cannot 
change the direction quickly. Japanese style management based on lifetime employment made it 
difficult to readjust the composition of employees. A study of Ken et al [10] showed that diffi-
culty in labor mobility among corporations in different industries was the hardest factor prevent-
ing the exit and entry of new firms from suiting the changing demands. Another factor was a 
misuse of subsidies that allowed inefficient enterprises survive. Some old enterprises losing the 
international comparative advantage did not dare to undertake new ventures in other industries or 
go abroad. 
.  
(7)  (Insufficient Bureaucracy reforms and privatization)  “Reforming the bureaucratic system” 
was a popular slogan in Japanese politics particularly after the burst of bubble, contrasting the ap-
praisal of the cooperation between bureaucrats and businesses in the 60s and the 70s. The primary 
reason was the publicized failure of the powerful ministries like Ministry of Finance in managing 
influential government banks like Long-Term Credit Bank etc. Deregulation of the MOF control 
of the banks and other financial institutions was belatedly undertaken but did not improve the ef-
ficiency of the private banks and other financial institutions overnight. The only successful exam-
ple of privatizing public enterprises was the National Railroad Company divided into 6 JR (Japan 
Railway) regional companies. The reform of Postal Public Enterprise was undertaken by the 
                                                        
5 Several chapters in Vol. I of [1] dealt with this issue and the resultant change of Industrial composition by means of 
Dynamic Models and Structural SVAR Models. Vol. Ⅱ of [1] dealt similarly with the financial sector.    
 8 
Koizumi Cabinet, but it remains to be seen whether it can follow the JR success or not. The core 
resistance comes from labor unions in bureaucracy and sectionalism among the ministries. 
(8)  (Wrong reforms of Japanese Style Management)  Inefficient aspects of Japanese style 
management have been depicted and often argued as something to improve in the globalizing 
world economy, as Japanese enterprises must go abroad too. T. Kagono [9] argues, however, that 
the reforms having adopted the American standards straight-forwardly to the Japanese corpora-
tions killed the strength of Japanese style management and made the Japanese top managers more 
hesitant to undertake the risky investment. This is one of the reasons for having discouraged Jap-
anese investment during the lost 90s and later. In particular,  
1)  share-holders’ lawsuit made easy;  
2)  bad timing to introduce quarterly settlement of accounts;  
3)  too detailed specification of corporate governance in the corporation law;  
4)  too early introduction of current price evaluation of Assets and Liabilities;  
5)  hasty introduction of American style internal control system into the Japanese corporations 
law, where they are managed with basically internal promotion and spot decisions.  
These bad reforms made Japanese managers much more averse to risk-taking than be-
fore. 
(Inappropriate functioning of banks and other financial companies)  The Japanese banking sys-
tem was efficient in the early postwar period up to the time of Plaza Accord in 1985, which agreed 
among G5 governments to rescue the twin imbalance of the US economy by increasing money 
supply and devaluating other major currencies against dollars. This ignited the bubble economy 
promoted by speculation in real-estate finance in many countries, particularly Japan. Until then, the 
Japanese banks simply responded to the ever-increasing demand for loanable funds with deliber-
ately lowered rate of interest. The banks were content by taking land as certain mortgage or curato-
rial whose prices ever kept rising. But after the burst of bubble economy, everything changed. 
Banks and other financial institutions were suddenly thrown into the uncertain and risky markets in 
the early 90s with little knowledge nor experiences of deflation. This made them very “defensive” 
or hesitant to do anything bold. Credit crunch or just buying the Japanese government bonds be-
came customary in financial investment.  
At the same time, hasty liberalization of capital markets, especially the short-term capital 
market in some developing counties like Thailand or Korea created the greedy financial specula-
tion in some Asian countries which led to Asian financial crisis in 1997-98 and affected also the 
Japanese financial sector. Symbolic was the bankruptcy of Yamaichi Securities Co., one of the 
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Major four security companies in Japan in November, 1997. Data show a dramatic shrinkage of 
Japanese bank loans. This must have caused the radical decrease in private investment mentioned 
as No. 1 factor for the lost two decades.  
Furthermore, the sub-prime loans problem occurred, and the Lehman Brothers holdings 
with more than 500 billion dollars assets filed bankruptcy in September, 2008--the world-wide 
financial crisis. This shattered the Japanese financial system and made them extremely hesitant in 
supporting the Japanese domestic and overseas investment. Some studies in Hayashi [1] showed 
that the credit cruch was particularly serious to the small and medium size enterprises, much more 
important in the Japan than abroad. We take this up in Section V.   
  
Table 4: Japanese Governments and Main Events in the World 
 
Year/  Japan cabinet Monetary Policies  Fiscal Policies Political Events 
1990 /2  Kaifu  /3 off.d.r. raized 
/8 off.d.r. raized 
/4 budget not dep.on 
gov. bonds 
/6 pub. Invest. Plan 
 
1991 /11Miyazawa  /7 off.d.r. lowered 
/11 off.d.r. lowered 
/12 off.d.r. lowered 
/9 emergency 
econ.policy 
/1  Gulf War 
1992  /4 off.d.r. lowered 




1993 /8 Hosokawa  /9 off.d.r. lowered /9 emergent pol.for 
¥ revalued 
/11 Maasricht Treaty for 
EU effected 
1994 /4 Hata 
/7 Murayama 
  /3 (New Election Law) 
/12 (Shinshin P. born) 
1995  /4 off.d.r. lowered 
/9 off.d.r. lowered 
/5 budget for dissik, 
bad hous, loan 
/2 (Hanshin Earthq.) 
1996 /1 Hasimoto  /4 cons. Tax rauzed /9(Democratic P. born)  
1997  /11 big bank crisis /5budgetreform law 
/12 ibid suspended 
/7 Asian Finan. Crisis 
/12 (Shinshin P dissol.) 
1998 /7 Obuchi    
1999  /2 zero inter. Policy  /1 Euro born  
2000 /4 Mori /8 zero I, pol. Stop /4 nursing system  
2001 /4 Koizumi /3 quant.easing pol. /1 centr.min,reform  
2002   /12 priv, of four 
highway ent, /4 Tax 
reduction; 3/4 Postal 
PE starts 
 
2003   /4 (Liberal P joins Dem) 
2004    
2005/     
2006 /6 Abe    
2007 /8 Fukuda    
2008 /9 Aso quant.easing pol  US Financial Crisis 
2009 /9 Hatoyama quant.easing pol   
2010 /6 Kan quant.easing pol   
2011 /8 ? quant.easing pol  /3 (Tohoku Earth q.) 
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(10)  (Mismanagement of Fiscal Expenditure and Taxation)  High-ranking officials of the Min-
istry of Finance used to take pride in maintaining the sound fiscal policy stance and were very 
cautious to issue the government bonds throughout postwar years. Their mismanagement of 
some large government banks in the bubble years, however, made them lose their authority to re-
sist the political pressure and resulted in giving the bureau of banking which controls the banking 
sector to the Prime Minister’s Office. And even changing the name of the historic Okura-sho 
(Ministry of Public Finance or Exchequer) to American Zaimu-sho (Ministry of Fiscal Admin-
istration). The Ministry of Finance in charge of fiscal spending and taxation simply followed the 
political pressure of populist government parties, one after another, as Table 4 shows, to spend as 
much as the parties requested with little consideration of fiscal efficiency. Political instability in 
the lost two decades may be contrasted against political stability in the immediately postwar Ja-
pan. Due to the failure in managing the public finance during the bubble years, the LDP (Liberal 
Democratic Party) lost the support of the general public, which made Japanese politics very un-
stable. This created uncertainty in the perspectives of entrepreneurs and made them hesitant to 
undertake any bold investment.  
The lost 90s began simultaneously with two dramatic events in the world: the fall of the So-
viet Union, and the burst of bubble. The latter is connected with the Plaza Accord in September, 
1985. Then came Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, and more recently the Lehman Brothers Finan-
cial Crisis in 2008-09. If the Japanese government had not been suffering from the heavy fiscal 
debt, it would have been easy to overcome the recessions with deflation by the standard Keynes-
ian policy with sufficient care for efficiency of fiscal policy. But the weak cabinets one after an-
other, except for Koizumi Cabinet, could not reduce the fiscal deficit. Political instability and 
weak government was really behind the ineffective economic policies. Table .4 gives a brief pic-
ture of political instability in Japan in the 1990s and 2000 to 2010. 
Even under these unfortunate experiences there are different opinions by some great 
economists who maintain the more positive Keynesian type of Demand-sider policies would have 
rescued the Japanese economy from plunging into the two decades of recessions and deflation and 
fiscal deficit all together. That is Klein-Adams-Kumasaka [12] and S. Shishido et al [18]. Their 
diagnoses are based on their respective macroeconometric models. Their works are awaiting the 
close examination of experts. A crucial point of implementation is that such policies must be 
maintained by the strongly supported governments. Otherwise, the so-called “stop and go” policies 
can never bear fruits even if the policies are theoretically correct. It is true that the Japanese fiscal 
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debt in terms of total government debt to nominal GDP ratio is the highest in the world, but its an-
nual debt burden is not as high as in the US and much lower than the UK. Thus this kind of policy 
can still be experimented under the strongly supported government. 
 
IV.  A Postmortem Diagnosis of Asian Financial Crisis6
 
 
The financial crisis in East Asian economies occurred in Thailand in July 1997 and quickly spread 
to other countries. There were preceding other serious economic phenomena, for instance, the 
burst of the bubble economy in Japan in the late 80’s. Besides, it is not an isolated crisis. There are 
many preceding and subsequent crises in the world. I would offer some notes to think about the 
financial crises in the late 90’s and to avoid the future similar crises in the early 21st Century. I 
maintain that for that purpose the reform of international financial institutions like IMF is highly 
desirable. 
 
1.  A Series of Financial Crises 
There have been a number of financial crises in the world ever since the post-World War II 
reconstruction was over in the 70’s. The main ones may be enumerated as follows: 
1) The two oil crises in the 70’s and the subsequent financial crises mainly in Latin American 
countries. 
2) 1979 debt crisis in Poland 
3) The mid-80’s Crises for Savings and Loans Associations in the US 
4) 1994 Mexican financial crisis 
5) The early 1990s burst of the bubble economy in Japan 
6) 1997 financial crisis in East Asian countries 
7) 1998 financial crisis in Russia 
8) 1998 financial crisis in Brazil 
9) 1998 bankruptcy of LTCM (Long Term Credit Management) in the US 
A reexamination of the financial crises must be made not only in light of observations in 
East Asia, but also the experiences of countries all over the world. 
2.  Diagnosis Tableau of East Asian Financial Crises 
In order to carefully observe and to comparatively examine the various experiences of fi-
                                                        
6 This secion is a modified version of Chapter 16 in Ichimura (2003) whichi is not in English version Ichimura (1998).  
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nancial crises in different countries, the following tableau may be useful.  
 
Table 5.  Diagnosis Tableau of Financial Crises 
 
Symptoms to observe J K T Ph Hk Th M S Iｎ C US 
 1  Real estate price inflation X X △ X X X △ △ △ △ △ 
 2  Stock prices inflation X X △ X X X △ △ △ △ △ 
 3  Flexible exchange rate  ◯ △ △ △ X X △ △ △ X ◯ 
 4  Appropriate exchange rate ◯ ◯ △ △ X X △ △ △ X ◯ 
 5  Foreign debt  ◯ X ◯ △ ◯ X X △ X △ X 
 6  Short-term debt ◯ X ◯ △ ◯ X △ ◯ X ◯ △ 
 7  Monitoring foreign debt ◯ X ◯ △ X X △ ◯ X △ △ 
 8  Capital transaction control X X ◯ △ X X △ ◯ X ◯ X 
 9  Government excessive guarantee ◯ X ◯ ◯ ◯ X △ ◯ X ◯ ◯ 
10  Ample foreign exchange reserve ◯ X ◯ △ ◯ X △ ◯ X ◯ ◯ 
11  Conservative Bank management X X △ △ ◯ X △ ◯ X △ △ 
12  Good corporate governance △ X △ △ X X △ ◯ X △ △ 
13 Corrupted politicians, bureaucrats & 
businessmen 
△ X △ X X X △ ◯ X △ △ 
14 Sound fiscal management X △ △ △ X ◯ △ ◯ △ △ ◯ 
15 Sound monetary policy △ △ ◯ △ ◯ Ｘ △ △ △ △ ◯ 
16 Overall evaluation -2 10 -7 2 3 13 1 -9 9 -2 -4 
 
 Overall evaluation is mechanically made by giving -1 to ◯, +1 to X, and 0 to . △.The 
scores given in this table are provided by the author’s judgment around the time of crises in each 
country, mostly in the late 90’s. The higher the score is, the more likely the financial crisis is likely 
to occur in the country.  Interpretation of this Table 1 requires some explanation. Most symptoms 
on the list would be understandable, but some items like capital transaction control may not be 
straightforward in its implication for financial crisis. In advanced economies like Japan and the US 
there is no control of capital transaction. In Taiwan, Singapore, or China, however, control of capi-
tal transaction is strictly imposed. This has contributed to avoid the financial crisis, so that the way 
of giving scores must be more carefully made. But overall the scores given on the basis of these 
symptoms seem to demonstrate which countries were more likely to encounter the financial crises. 
Clearly Thailand is most exposed to the danger of financial crisis, and then follows Korea 
and Indonesia. In fact, financial crises did not occur to all the countries or areas in East Asia in the 
late 90’s. There are significant differences in the degree of exposition to financial crisis among the 
East Asian countries and areas. Thailand, Korea and Indonesia encountered the most serious crises 
for the good reasons. 
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The external debt situations, important in this table, of the critical three countries in East 
Asia are shown below. This is the reliable up-to-date information available to outsiders then. 
 
Table 6a: External Debt of Korea, Indonesia and Thailand 
 
Units Korea Indonesia Thailand 
Billion $,  % 1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999 
 External Debt  (total) 159.2 148.7 136.4* 136.2 150.9 - 93.7 86.2 75.6 
     －long-term 95.7 118.0 98.3* 100.3 121.7 - 56.5 59.4 61.9 
        －public - - - 55.9 66.9 - 22.3 28.1 23.6 
        －private - - - 44.5 54.7 - 34.1 31.3 25.5 
     －short-term 63.6 30.7 38.1* 32.9 20.1 - 34.8 23.5 13.7 
（GDP） 476.5 320.7 414.5 215.7 94.2 141.7 150.6 112.2 126.3 
External Debt vs GDP 33.41 46.36 32.91 63.12 160.24 - 62.23 76.77 59.83 
     －long-term- 20.08 36.79 23.72 46.51 129.22 - 37.49 52.93 49.01 
        －public - - - 25.90 71.10 - 14.82 25.05 18.67 
        －private - - - 20.61 58.12 - 22.67 27.88 20.19 
     －short-term 13.35 9.57 9.19 15.23 21.36 - 23.13 20.96 10.83 
Sources: Korea (MOFE、http//epic.kdi.re.kr） , Indonesia （ADB、WB） , Thailand (ADB, 
http//www.bot. r.th）; ADB: The Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators; GDP: ICSEAD（2000）; 
WB:, Global Development Finance 
Notes: 1．GDP in 1999 is calculated by assuming our projected growth rates: Korea （8.5％）, In-
donesia (0.0％）, Thailand （4.0％） for their own real income in terms of its own currency unit. 2．* 
means preliminary. 3．The External Debt of Korea on the basis of WB （ADB） may be extrapo-
                                            
Table 6-b 
 Units  WB base MOFE base  
 Bilion $, % 1997 1998 1999 1997 1998 1999 
  External 
  
137.0 139.1 127.6 159.2 148.7 136.4 
   －
 
72.1 94.1 - 95.7 118.0 98.3 
    －public 33.9 58.0 - - - -  
     －
 
38.3 36.1 - - - -  
  －
 
53.8 28.1 34.9 63.6 30.7 38.1  
 （GDP） 476.5 320.7 414.5 476.5 320.7 414.5  
 Ext.Debt/GD
 
28.75 43.37 30.8 73.79 46.36 32.91  
  － long 
 
15.14 29.33 - 44.36 36.79 23.72  
     －
 
7.10 18.07 - - - -  
     －
 
8.03 11.26 - - - -  
  －
 
11.29 8.770 8.43 13.35 9.57 9.19  
 
3. Lessons from the Financial Crises 
Thus, we are able to draw some lessons from the financial crises in East Asia and other 
countries. Main lessons are summarized as follows: 
1) Pay attention to the competition and complementarity between China and other East Asian 
economies. 
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2) Don’t forget the business cycles in the East Asian economies 
3)  Overvaluation of its currency vis a vis main trade partners’ currencies is dangerous 
4)  Watch the debt service ratio. If it does not go below 30% for many years, such growth rates 
are not sustainable. 
5) Sudden surge in the inflow of short-term capital funds is a red signal. 
6) The extraordinary increase of real estate values is a symptom of financial crisis.  
7) The hyper-inflationary increase of stock prices due to speculation is a symptom of financial cri-
sis. Similarly the steady decline of stock prices also a symptom of financial crisis.  
8) Financial crisis will hit most seriously the greedy, mismanaged banks and enterprises with poor 
corporate governance, particularly in assets and liabilities management. 
9) Financial crises are almost always related to the corruption connecting politicians, bureaucrats 
and businessmen. Conversely if corruption remains moderate, serious financial crises are un-
likely to take place. 
10) Excessive guarantees of the government and the central banks without adequate backup of 
foreign exchange reserve often aggravate the crises and create the country risks. 
11) The so-called “Washington Consensus” was not necessarily the best diagnosis of the critical 
conditions in most East Asian economies. Their analytical capability and policy suggestions 
have limitations7
12) The objections of the US government and the international financial institutions to the increase 
of the capital funds have turned out to be inadequate. This requires the further consideration as 
follows. 
. 
13) What is most urgently needed and very important in all the countries is the reform of regula-
tions and institutions to require the strict monitoring of all the important financial transactions of 
the banks and financial corporations. 
14) Such re-regulations or de-regulations and reorganization of financial institutions and activities 
are needed not only domestically but internationally.  
 
4. Reform of International Financial Organizations 
Half a century has passed since the Bretton Woods system was established. As we discussed 
at the beginning, many financial crises have occurred in the world. Every time, the IMF and the 
World Bank moved to overcome those crises. Their policy prescriptions were based on the Wash-
                                                        
7 Criticisms on Washington Concensus was repeated later when Central European countries faced the financial crises for 
transition from Socialist to Market economies. See Ichimura et al (2009).   
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ington Consensus, which were not necessarily adequate in all the cases nor fairly implemented in 
all the cases. For instance, 
1) The IMF offered almost the same diagnosis for the Mexican crises in 1994 and the East Asian 
crisis in 1997 despite the significant differences in fiscal and other conditions between Mexico 
and East Asian economies and implementation was much slower.  
2) The IMF experts did not understand the underlying problems of East Asian economies. For 
instance, they were saying that Indonesia was an ideal borrower. 
3) The policies implemented in Thailand and Korea were based on the Washington Consensus 
and could have been free from grievous faults, but those in Indonesia were quite inadequate in 
demanding the cut of subsidies to kerosene oil and food as well as stopping the loans to many 
small enterprises. Such policies forced the bankruptcy of many enterprises in the country where 
no bankruptcy law existed. After all, those policies had to be greatly remedied later. 
4) On the other hand, Malaysia could overcome the crisis with neither any help nor advice from 
the IMF.  
5) The rescue plan for Russia was determined with no regard to the Washington Consensus. It was 
simply a political decision. Who are responsible for such a decision may be questioned.  
6) The US government was against the monitoring the international financial transactions by 
Hedge funds and other credit funds, but after the bankruptcy of LTCM8
7) It is clear that some kind of international regulations is needed, particularly from the viewpoint 
of small economies, to monitor and regulate the large amount of capital transaction into and out 
of the developing economies.  
 it seems to have 
changed its position.  
In other words, the monopolistic position of the World Bank and the IMF combined in 
dealing with the financial crises in any place of the world. As the World Bank is supplemented 
by the ADB and other regional development banks, so does the IMF need to be supplemented 
by the regional monetary funds. At the moment, there are specifically three problems in the 
present international financial institutions. 
Both the World Bank and the IMF have only insufficient funds to cope with the serious finan-
cial crises in the contemporary world. This has been recognized by the authorities of the Bank 
and the Funds, but it was the US government and the Congress that have consistently against the 
increase of capital in both organizations.  
                                                        
8 This important event is relatively unknown abroad due to the control of information maybe by NYFRB. But this is very 
closely related to the World Financial Crisis in 2008. 
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In handling the East Asian financial crises the amount of loans extended to the suffering 
countries from the IMF will not exceed one quarter of the total loans in almost all the countries. 
The main supplier of the loans was the Japanese Overseas Cooperation Bank. The US govern-
ment pledged a certain amount but never implemented it, even a penny. 
The officials of the Funds stay in the region at best only for a few years. It would be impossi-
ble for those coming from Washington D. C. to learn the social and economic conditions in so 
many developing countries in Asia.  
8) Hence, the Funds must be supplemented by a regional monetary fund like ADB for WB.  
9) The Japanese government proposed soon after the financial crisis in Thailand in 1997 to establish 
an Asian Monetary Funds, but it was the US government that flatly refused even to consider it. 
Later on, however, when a similar idea was proposed as an informal Miyazawa initiative, all the 
governments concerned including the US supported it. Again, later, the mutual agreement to ac-
commodate the necessary funds at the time of crises among Asian economies was supported 
even by the US government as well as Chinese and other Asian countries. 
What is needed now is the reform of the international financial institutions and to devise the 
adequate regulations and institutions to handle the globalized international economy. The estab-
lishment of EC and Euro has given an impact to reorganize the world economy. The world 
economy is moving toward the Tripartite world; namely, the American continent, the European 
hemisphere, and the Asian world. How to manage them is one of the great tasks of the world 
economy, but the modest first step will be to establish some regional financial organization that is 
capable of handling the kind of financial crises we have just had in the past decade.                    
 
V.  Who are Responsible for the World Financial Crisis in 2008? 
1.   Wrong US Policies and Fraudulent Credit Rating Agencies9
Now (mid-2008) the world economy seems to be at the entrance to the Great Depression. If any 
serious mistakes are made in economic policies, the Great Depression like the one in the 30s may 
come again. Many excellent studies on the Great Depression are available to learn from. More 
recently the Japanese economy has just experienced the miserable recessions mainly due to the 
burst of the bubble economy in the early 90s. If, therefore, we have learnt the lessons from the 
experiences and adopt the appropriate policies, we should be able to overcome the recessions in a 
year and half to two years. Similarly with the US and Europe, many outstanding economists and 
 
                                                        
9 This is a revised version of my essay in Japanese published in the Yamaguchi Bank Monthly, January 2009 but it was 
written in mid-2008 and privately circulated to bankers and politicies.  
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financial experts are there too. Yet they are repeating the same kinds of blunders over and over 
again. Why couldn’t they anticipate the serious recessions before they aggravated this much and 
have taken appropriate policy measures? One could not be too optimistic about the future if we 
had to extrapolate this past stupid repetition of mistakes. One could ask; who are really responsi-
ble for this world financial crisis in 2008?  
Postponing the detailed discussions, I state my frank conclusions first. Exposition follows 
later.  The heaviest responsibility lies on the three bodies:  
(1) The US government’s “super-optimism” on the US economy, 
(2)  Credit Rating Agencies’ fraudulent rating of various securities and derivatives; 
(3)  Investment banks excessive speculative investment with extreme leverage ratios.  
 
2.  Why wasn’t the World Financial Crisis anticipated? 
Was it so difficult to anticipate the 2008 WFC? Of course not. Inflation of real estate prices 
has been continuing since a few years before. The same was true in Europe. Particularly in big 
cities like London, Paris etc. it was very conspicuous. Many economists as well as journalists had 
already observed the burst of bubble in Japan in the early 90s and Asian financial crisis in Thai-
land in 1997 so many of them warned against the burst of bubble economy. But no government 
in any country did not take stern action against it. Why? The circumstances are just the same as 
the one in Japan in the late 80s. Everyone knows that it cannot go on, but while one believes 
nothing will happen a few more months, suddenly the end comes.  
Moreover, inflation in real estate price stimulates the demand for and investment in housing 
and thereby prolongs prosperity. The US government at war needed a continuation of booms so 
that it stimulated housing investment by tax reduction for housing loans. These tax exemption 
policies stimulated housing investment and maintained prosperity longer and kept the US growth 
rate higher than usual for the time being. 
 
3.  Tricks of Sub-prime Loans 
The financial crisis this time was ignited by the sub-prime loans. It looks like a kind of low 
interest-rate loan for housing. Actually the low interest charge is only for the beginning few years. 
After the initial period, the interest rate becomes normal and repayment of principal begins. If in-
flation of real estate goes on, one could get the house only with the low payment at the beginning 
and sell the house before the higher payment starts. But if inflation stops and house prices come 
down, then many buyers cannot continue to repay the higher monthly payments and the loans 
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become unpaid. Many banks faced an enormous amount of unpaid loans with low value mort-
gages and bankrupted. Mr. Greenspan, an outstanding former chairman of the FRB, admitted at 
the Congress hearing on this issue that the practice of this kind of loans extended widely without 
any prudent examination or checking was a serious mistake and failure of the FRB. This really 
resembles with the cases of Japanese commercial banks at the time of bubble years.  
 
4.  Credit Rating Agencies’ Fraudulent Rating of Securities and Derivatives 
The world financial crisis this time is much more serious than the burst of the bubble econ-
omy in Japan in the early 90s. If the US government had not give the government loans to private 
banks, insurance companies, security companies at all, then almost all the famous financial com-
panies in the US—as some say, except for Wells Fargo Bank—would have bankrupted. In the 
case of Japan, many banks and security companies would have bankrupted too, but the main ones 
like Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Nomura would have survived. European banks would have faced the 
situations closer to the US. Perhaps, however, the situations might have been more serious than in 
the US. 
There are some significant differences between Japanese financial institutions and 
US-European institutions. The first difference is that almost no “derivatives” are dealt with in Ja-
pan. The second is that the banks’ “leverage ratio” is far lower in Japan than in the US or Europe.  
The most problematic is “derivatives.” A few decades ago dealing with the real estate by se-
curitization began. Then the object of investment was clear. One of initiators was Edwin Mills 
now at Northwestern U. Then began dealing with a combination of some such securities was de-
vised as a new security and put on the market. Then again a combination of such combined secu-
rities was marketed as “derivatives.” By combining some securities, it was argued, one could re-
duce the risks involved. It was believed that risks would be further reduced by combining the 
combined securities so that they carried even higher rating than the original components, accord-
ing to the rating given by credit-rating agencies. But nobody knows what they have bought or sold. 
Even professionals were actually cheated by the dealings of derivatives. Then appeared the 
so-called Credit-Rating agencies like Moody, Standard and Poor’s, and they gave their ranks to 
each kind of security like AAA or AA etc. Customers trusted the ranking and bought them. But 
during the crisis, almost all securities including AAA dropped the values. Responsibility of grad-
ing companies are extremely important, but they take no responsibility. In other words, their rat-
ing has turned out to be utterly unreliable. They never specifically announced or publicized the 
reasons for their ranking. The most fundamental reason of the crisis this time lies in this point.  
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   To perceive this danger would not have even too difficult, because we have already known 
the case of LTCM taking place earlier for almost the same reason. In Japan a famous mathemati-
cian and essayist Masashi Fujiwara pointed out the Genius’ erroneous calculation in his famous 
book: Nobility of Nations earlier. 
 
5. Why did the Financial Crisis spread to Europe? 
    Further discussions on some other reasons for financial crisis in the US will be omitted here. 
But another important aspect is that it spread quickly to Europe and caused more serious crises in 
some countries like Iceland. The reason is that even major banks in UK, France, Germany and 
Switzerland relied heavily on the borrowing for their loans. This is the same as the case of Lehman 
Brothers. This is demonstrated by their leverage ratio (total loans to own capital ratio). The ratios of 
European banks were almost twice as high as American banks, as the follow table from Fortune 
magazine shows.  
 
Table 7  Leverage Ratios: Each Bank’s Loans / Capital Ratio 
Barcleys Bank 61.1 B of America 11.1 
DeutschEe Bank 53.1 Goldman Sacks 26.1 
ING group 49.1 Lehman Brothers 31.1 
UBS 47.1   
 
European banks relied on the borrowed funds about half for loans, whereas American banks 
did the same about 30% or less. Hence, the damage from the fall of derivatives values was much 
more serious to European banks than American banks. The reasons why European banks invest-
ed so much in the derivatives in the US was their high rates of return that was made possible by 
the continued prosperity of the US economy. It was mainly due to the short-term success of the 
US government’s stimulating cyclic policies. Given the triple dilemma of the low rate of saving, 
fiscal deficit, and trade imbalance, however, it is inconceivable for the US economy to maintain 
the 4 % growth rate any longer. 
  
６、Failures in American economic policies and their future 
Business cycles are unavoidable in the US economy, It was wrong on the part of the US 
government to have ignored such historic facts with unrealistic super-optimism. Some journalistic 
columnists blame the “market fundamentalism”, but it is not right. There is no theory or funda-
mental preachings in economics to say that market solves the ups and downs of business cycles by 
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market mechanism. What was wrong was the economic policies of the government and the FRB. 
More concretely the excessive stimulus given to housing investment and loans plus the lack of su-
pervision of those policies on the part of the government authorities and the FRB. On this score, 
the responsible advisers in the Bush administration were too simplistic. In the middle part of Sep-
tember, 2008 there was a general meeting of the Mont Perlin Society in Tokyo, in which I had a 
chance to raise this question to Chairman of the Committee of economic Advisers, Dr. Edward P. 
Lazear. I asked him, “As I believe, there is excessive financing the speculative investment in hous-
ing loans in the US. Don’t you think that some restrictive regulations are needed on such financing 
the speculative investment?” He flatly answered, “No, I don’ agree with you.” After the session, I 
had some further talks with him, but he had no recognition of the danger to show up in the US then. 
It is very clear, however, that he must have changed his opinions by now if he supports the later 
views of Secretary of Finance and the chairman of FRB. Changes in the American policies were at 
least too late by a year and half or two years. They changed the policies only after the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers and the consequent fall of stock prices. But too late were the policy changes in 
Europe and Japan as well. In October 2008 the President of the US called for an international con-
ference with 20 major nations’ government representatives and put on the table 16 proposals and 
an action plan, including the reform of the IMF to increase its funds. Most of proposals are appro-
priate but belatedly proposed. How much of them and how soon they will be implemented is cru-
cial. If not, implemented soon the world may face more serious recessions like the Great Depres-
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